No Industry, No Future? by Fontagné, Lionel et al.
No Industry, No Future?
Lionel Fontagne´, Pierre Mohnen, Guntram Wolff
To cite this version:
Lionel Fontagne´, Pierre Mohnen, Guntram Wolff. No Industry, No Future?. [Research Report]
Conseil d’Analyse Economique. 2014. <hal-01299902>
HAL Id: hal-01299902
https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-01299902
Submitted on 13 May 2016
HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access
archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci-
entific research documents, whether they are pub-
lished or not. The documents may come from
teaching and research institutions in France or
abroad, or from public or private research centers.
L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est
destine´e au de´poˆt et a` la diffusion de documents
scientifiques de niveau recherche, publie´s ou non,
e´manant des e´tablissements d’enseignement et de
recherche franc¸ais ou e´trangers, des laboratoires
publics ou prive´s.
This Note is published under the sole responsibility of its authors
French Council of Economic Analysis
Lionel Fontagnéa, Pierre Mohnenb 
and Guntram Wolﬀ c
No Industry, No Future?
I n a context of weak growth, high unemployment, unba-lanced public ﬁ nances and persistent external deﬁ cit, we are witnessing the return of a proactive approach 
to industrial policy and, even in France the return of direct 
intervention in industry. Sector-focused public interven-
tion is thus once again conceivable, while industry is once 
more perceived as a reservoir of jobs, exports and growth.
Can there be a future without industry? Answering 
this question is not considered as obvious in this Note. 
Reﬂ ection appears to be essential with regard to the aim of 
industrial policy (what is industry and why is it needed?) as 
well as its methods (does the government have the tools, 
information and modus operandi required for its action?)
The frontier between industry and services has become 
blurred: services have become an industry; industry buys 
and sells services; and ﬁ nally, a proportion of companies 
classiﬁ ed as services are in reality industrial companies 
that have split their value chain at the international level. 
Today, industrial activity consists in designing products, 
producing them or having them produced, while retaining 
intellectual property thereof, organising the value chain, 
controlling brands and consumer access, and ﬁ nally 
making returns on investment.
This more modern vision of industry calls for a renewed 
approach to industrial policy. Beyond the traditional 
opposition between horizontal policies, aimed at creating 
a favourable economic environment, and vertical policies, 
that support certain sectors, public action needs to remedy 
coordination failures (cluster policies, public ﬁ nancing of 
innovative projects) and construct modes of action that 
take into account the political economy of public action 
regarding companies.
We argue that industry needs to be redeﬁ ned and no longer 
be assimilated to the mere production of goods. This 
requires an adaptation of the political discourse and a will 
to encourage restructuring and technological dynamism. 
Consequently, it is necessary to invest in training and to 
promote the mobility of resources that can be concentrated 
in growth centres. The reason why most economic 
reports conclude with this recommendation is probably 
that it needs to be prioritised within the economic policy 
agenda. In a context of non-cooperative national policies, 
it appears desirable, from a quite pragmatic point of view, 
for the government to promote investment in research 
and development through the R&D tax credit, direct aid 
mechanisms such as the French innovation agency ANVAR 
(Agence nationale de valorisation de la recherche), venture 
capital and the transfer of technologies. The protection 
of intellectual property is another important and diﬃ  cult 
issue, in which a balance needs to be struck between the 
stimulation of innovation and the sharing of knowledge, 
both sources of future technological progress. The last 
two recommendations concern the modus operandi of 
industrial policy, taking into account the political economy 
of these interventions and the risks of regulatory capture: 
it is desirable to combine private venture capital and 
public ﬁ nancing of projects as well as a strict governance 
of public intervention notably one that allows projects to 
be discontinued.
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French industry’s diﬃ  culty 
in recovering from the crisis
The diﬃ  culties encountered by French industry can be sum-
marized by the following vicious circle:
 – the recent decrease in the proportion of value-added 
attributable to industry was more pronounced in France 
than in comparable countries; it therefore goes beyond 
the phenomenon of deindustrialisation;
 – this decrease is a result of losses of market share at the 
international level;
 – these losses of market share result, in particular, from 
a deterioration of cost competitiveness, which is par-
tially passed on export prices, with proﬁ t margins being 
adjusted downwards;
 – insuﬃ  cient non-price competitiveness, which does not 
allow inﬂ ated costs to be reﬂ ected in prices, is compounded 
by a lack of investment due to insuﬃ  cient proﬁ t margins.1
At constant prices, between 2000 and 2007, the propor-
tion of the total value-added attributable to industry fell by 
6% in France and Italy, and by 16% in the United Kingdom. 
At the same time, it increased by 4% in the United States2 
and by 6% in Germany (Figure 1). Since the onset of the cri-
sis, the diﬀ erences in development between countries have 
become even more pronounced (Figure 2). At the lowest 
level, industrial production in the major European countries 
declined by between 13% (United Kingdom) and 26% (Spain), 
as compared with the beginning of 2007. France is among 
the severely aﬀ ected countries (– 21%), alongside Germany 
(– 20%). However, the main diﬀ erence between the latter two 
countries is Germany’s recovery, which enabled the pre-cri-
sis level to be reached again in 2011. The cases of Italy and 
Spain correspond to a more dramatic version of the course 
of events in France.
The value of France’s share of the global market declined 
by 15% between 2000 and 2007 and, once again, by 13% 
between 2007 and 2010. Comparison with other European 
countries shows that French under-performance was particu-
larly marked before the crisis.3 Conversely, since 2007 the 
French evolution is in line with that of other European coun-
tries. Between 2000 and 2007, neither top-of-the-range nor 
technological products constituted a safe haven for French 
exporters. Unit-wage costs (wage cost per unit of value-add-
ed) weighed unfavourably in the case of France, in particu-
lar as compared to Germany: they have increased by 10% in 
Germany since 2000, and by three times as much in France.4
The authors would like to thank Jean Beuve for his comments on a preliminary draft.
1 The Note from the French Treasury (L’industrie : quels déﬁ s pour l’économie française, February 2014) is a good illustration of this demonstrative model.
2 For an analysis of the development of the manufacturing sector in the United States, see Bailey M.N. and B.P Bosworth (2014): “US Manufacturing: 
Understanding Its Past and Its Potential Future”, Journal of Economic Perspectives, vol. 28, no 1, pp. 3-26.
3 See Cheptea A., C. Emlinger, L. Fontagné, G. Oreﬁ ce, O. Pindyuk and R. Stehrer (2014): The Development of EU and EU Member States, External 
Competitiveness , CEPII Working Paper, no 2014-06.
4 Eurostat: Unit cost of labour, economy as a whole.
1. Development of the share of manufacturing 
industry in the total value-added
in volume (2000 = 100)
Source: OCDE-STAN.
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Observation 1. French industry encounters 
diﬃ  culties in recovering from the crisis, 
probably due to increasing backwardness 
in the course of the 2000s, and partly 
because of diverging labour costs compared 
to German competitors, for given levels of 
qualiﬁ cation.
This ﬁ rst observation calls for an essential re-examination of 
industrial policy regarding its goals (what is industry and why 
is it needed?) and its means (does the State have the tools, 
information and modus operandi required to implement its 
action?).
What is industry?
According to the deﬁ nition given by the French national sta-
tistical institute (INSEE: Institut national de la statistique et 
des études économiques), “industry comprises economic 
activities that combine factors of production (…) in order to 
produce material goods intended for the market”.5 Goods are 
“physical objects for which demand exists, and with regard to 
which ownership rights can be established (…)”.
Industry services
Industrial reality barely ﬁ ts this deﬁ nition: some manufactur-
ing enterprises also produce services, others mainly produce 
services, and others no longer produce anything but services. 
About a quarter of the manufacturing enterprises established 
in France only sold services in 2007, approximately a third 
mainly sold services, and 87% also sold services.6 In many 
industries, these proportions reﬂ ect the growing weight of 
services in the sales of companies belonging to the manufac-
turing sector. Today, consumers are used to buying insepara-
ble goods and services, sold by industrial enterprises, such 
as extended warranties for cars for instance. Industry and 
services are also bound to each other by intermediate con-
sumption: the variety and the cost of the services that pro-
ducers of goods may have access to are an essential element 
of their competitiveness. With the outsourcing of numerous 
functions, industry increasingly relies upon services.
This hazy boundary gives rise to diﬃ  culties for statisticians: 
industrial enterprises have focused on their core competen-
cies and outsourced some of their tasks to the service sec-
tor, while the latter has simultaneously shifted from goods 
towards services.
Service industry
Similar changes are occurring in services. Like industry, the 
production of services, in particular those linked to informa-
tion technologies, is characterised by value creation based 
upon economies of scale (presence of ﬁ xed costs) and large 
productivity gains. The most widely-known examples of serv-
ices produced according to “industrial” methods are those 
of data centres, search engines and cloud computing, all of 
which are energy-intensive activities, requiring high levels 
of ﬁ xed assets (server farms, cooling systems, secure sites, 
etc.), in no way inferior to those of traditional industrial sites, 
and for which the costs rapidly decrease. While (industrial) 
factories no longer have chimneys, service producers have 
taken over: each Google data centre includes hundreds of 
thousands of servers which need to be cooled. The twenty 
leading US market capitalisations (as of 11th March 2014) 
include Apple, Google, Microsoft, IBM, Verizon, Facebook, 
Oracle and Amazon: are the latter industrial companies or 
service companies?
Task trading
The international splitting of value-added chains constitutes 
the latest and most spectacular of these trends, which cross 
the boundary between industry and services. With task trad-
ing,7 some of the most high-performance industrial com-
panies have focused their activity upon their competitive 
advantages in product design, marketing, organisation of the 
supply chain and creation of homogeneous “systems” com-
bining goods and services, while abandoning all physical pro-
duction in the process. These are referred to as Factoryless 
Goods Producers (FGPs). The most frequently cited examples 
thereof are Apple, Dyson and companies in the semiconduc-
tors and clothing sectors.8 According to recent calculations,9 
the reclassiﬁ cation of US wholesale trade companies, which 
design their products and organise the production thereof, to 
industry would transfer at least half a million jobs to the lat-
ter sector. These changes in the industrial landscape have led 
statisticians to engage in detailed examinations regarding the 
classiﬁ cation of enterprises at the international level. Thus, 
the Conference of European Statisticians10 considers it nec-
essary to substitute the criterion of intellectual property for 
5 INSEE website déﬁ nitions et méthodes” section.
6 See Crozet M. and E. Milet (2014a): “Is Everybody in Services? The Servitization of French Manufacturing Firms” in The Factory-Free Economy: What Next 
for the 21st Century?, Fontagné and Harrison (ed.), forthcoming. The authors have used data on standard real proﬁ ts (BRN: bénéﬁ ces réels normaux) collected 
by the French Tax Directorate to establish their ﬁ gures.
7 See Grossman G.M. and E. Rossi-Hansberg (2008): “Trading Tasks: A Simple Theory of Oﬀ shoring”, American Economic Review, vol. 98, no 5, pp. 1978-97.
8 The US statistical category of “own brand importer-marketer”, which appears in the Wholesale Trade Survey typically corresponds to FGPs.
9 See Bernard A.B. and T.C. Fort Teresa (2014): “Factoryless Goods Producers in the US” in The Factory-Free Economy: What Next for the 21st Century?, 
Fontagné and Harrison (ed.), forthcoming. The quoted ﬁ gure corresponds to a reclassiﬁ cation within a sample from the enquiry into the wholesale trade in 
the United States. Extrapolation to the sector as a whole results in the high-range estimate of 1.9 million jobs in 2007.
10 Coming under the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe.
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the one of ownership of raw materials (the traditional criteri-
on) in the deﬁ nition of a enterprise’s economic boundaries.11
Observation 2. The nature of industry 
is changing as industry and services are 
becoming one single entity. The boundaries 
of companies are changing with the 
splitting of the value chains. The deﬁ ning 
characteristic of an “industrial” company 
is its involvement in product design, 
intellectual property and economic risk. The 
deﬁ ning characteristic of “industry” is mass 
production, economies of scale, productivity 
gains and the application of technical 
progress.
What is industry for?
Whatever the boundary attributed to industry and services, 
the important point is, above all, the capacity of new activi-
ties to generate income. On the basis of census data con-
cerning 8 million employees in 320 employment areas over 
a period of 30 years, Moretti (2013) contrasts “brain hubs” 
–urban areas grouping together highly-qualiﬁ ed high-income 
employees, each of which give rise to ﬁ ve job creations–, to 
former industrial capitals, which are declining in terms of 
jobs and inhabitants.12 The diﬀ erence between these two 
types of areas is not attributable to some putative bound-
ary between industry and services, but to concentration of 
qualiﬁ cations. More fundamentally, this raises the question 
of structural change: since the post-war period, the OECD 
economies have to a very large extent moved from agricul-
ture and industry to services. Deindustrialisation –statisti-
cally speaking– is only one aspect of the process of demate-
rialisation of growth in our economies.13
Economic analysis of structural change
Between the post-war period and 2012, the share of value-
added accounted for by agriculture was divided by ten (in 
value terms) and that of industry was halved, whereas serv-
ices increased from 48 to 79%. This structural change14 has 
been accompanied by strong growth in purchasing power15 
and the creation of more than 6 million jobs since 1954. If 
productivity grows faster in industry than in services,16 then 
relative prices change and expenditure shifts from the former 
to the latter in value terms. At the same time, since industry 
produces more value-added with less personnel, it contrib-
utes to distributing income into the economy, creating a vast 
market for marketable services, which in turn create jobs, 
absorbing the workforce released from industry (since the 
automation of services proves more diﬃ  cult).
Moreover, with increases in per capita income, modes of 
consumption change, in accordance with Engel’s law. Just 
as bread was replaced in household budgets by meat-based 
food, and then the latter by ready-made food, industrial goods 
are in turn replaced by services such as leisure, health care 
and education. Budgetary shares naturally shift towards ser-
vices, if preferences change with diﬀ erent income brackets. 
The low level of responsiveness of the demand for industrial 
goods to increases in incomes, when the latter are already 
high, means that the volume of demand for these goods 
grows less quickly than productivity (i.e. revenues).
Industry contributes to the balancing of the 
current account
A major argument in favour of the maintenance of indus-
try relates to the balancing of the current account. Indeed, 
goods can be exported, whereas services have to be pro-
duced locally, favouring foreign direct investment. If industry 
is replaced by services, our economy will no longer export 
and will have to import all of the products that it consumes. 
Even if a proportion of services cross the border and con-
tribute to exports (e.g. business services), and although the 
establishment of a presence abroad is often a deliberate 
choice in order to sell French products on foreign markets, 
changes in the balance of goods and the balance of services 
over the last twenty years suggest that goods play a predomi-
nant role in the evolution of the current account (Figure 3). 
France has therefore been unable to oﬀ set the deterioration 
of its foreign trade in goods through suﬃ  cient improvement 
of its trade in services.17
Nevertheless, industry and services indirectly contribute to 
rebalancing the current account through net income from 
foreign direct investment (FDI). The presence of French 
groups abroad gives rise to proﬁ ts, which are partly returned 
11 United Nations (2013): Progress Report of the Task Force on Global Production, no ECE/CES/BUR/2013/FEB/17.
12 See Moretti E. (2013): The New Geography of Jobs, Mariner Books.
13 See Imbs J. (2014): “Structural Change in the OECD: Some Facts” in The Factory-Free Economy: What Next for the 21st Century?, Fontagné and Harrison 
(ed.), forthcoming, for analysis of the OECD economies as a whole, and Veugelers R. (2013): “Manufacturing Europe’s Future”, Bruegel Blueprint, no 21, for 
an analysis of the situation in the European Union.
14 Structural change is therefore deﬁ ned by a change in the sector composition of total expenditure. 
15 The standard of living precisely doubled in France between 1970 and 2011. Standard of living can be deﬁ ned as the average income of individuals within 
households whose income declared to the tax authorities is positive or nil and who are not students (cf. INSEE-DGI).
16 See Baumol W. (1967): “Macroeconomics of Unbalanced Growth: The Anatomy of Urban Crisis”, American Economic Review, vol. 57, no 3, pp. 415-426.
17 It should be noted that “exports” (and “imports”) of services include tourism (positive balance of 11 billion euros in 2012 for a total positive balance of 
33 billion) (cf. OECD).
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to France, partly reinvested locally and partly accounted for 
by the payment of interest by foreign subsidiaries on loans 
granted by their parent companies in France. Gross FDI 
income reached 53 billion euros in 2012,18 after having virtu-
ally reached 60 billion in 2010.19 The most important trend of 
the decade of the 2000s was the very strong increase in FDI 
income: the latter was multiplied by ﬁ ve in ten years.
Exporting goods means exporting services
As already mentioned, services are to a large extent used as 
intermediate consumption by industry, due in particular to 
the outsourcing of service activities by industrial companies. 
Thus, part of the value-added arising from services is export-
ed through the trading of goods, whereas the local industrial 
value-added of the same goods is often limited by the import 
of intermediate inputs. Calculations of trade in added-value 
make it possible to take into account the “inter-industrial” 
relations linking services to industry and to reﬁ ne the analy-
sis of cost competitiveness.20 In 2011, 39% of the European 
value-added of exports (outside of Europe) of manufactured 
products corresponded to inputs of services.21 This propor-
tion is increasing (it was at 35% in 1995). We have therefore 
witnessed a twofold change: the European value added of 
European exports has been declining (85% in 2011 as com-
pared with 92% in 1995) but a growing proportion of this 
value added is accounted for by value added in services.
We now consider European countries individually. The pro-
portion of French value-added in French total exports (all 
sectors, intra- and extra EU) decreased from 80.5% to 71.5% 
between 1995 and 2001.22 This ﬁ gure is quite similar to that 
observed in European countries of comparable size. The 
share of domestic value-added in the value-added of exports 
is everywhere greater for services than for goods, even when 
the service content of exported goods is taken into account, 
as we do here. Thus, services are of increasing importance 
for re-balancing the current account.
Industry, a source of externality
The bulk of corporate research is conducted within industry: 
in 2010, 80% of the domestic expenditure on research and 
development (R&D) conducted in enterprises in France was 
concentrated in the industrial sectors, as compared to 18% in 
services. However, since 2007 R&D has increased by 15.8% 
in volume per year in services, reﬂ ecting, as in other OECD 
countries, the increasing importance of services at the level of 
research.23 Research is considered to be one of the pillars of 
sustainable growth. Through R&D expenditure, enterprises and 
government invest in the production of knowledge, generat-
ing new products and manufacturing techniques which enable 
companies to remain competitive in terms of production costs, 
quality and product diversiﬁ cation. In the long term, this knowl-
edge means productivity gains and increasing welfare.
R&D also generates two types of spillovers: rent spillovers 
and knowledge spillovers. The former involve increases in 
rents and turnover in one sector as a result of research con-
ducted in another sector (for example, the appearance of new 
18 For France in 2012 the inbound income of 53 billion represented more value-added than the agri-food and transport equipment industries (cf. OECD).
19 Foreign companies located in France naturally also pay dividends and interest to their parent companies, but the total amount was limited to 20 billion 
euros in 2012. A proportion of this sum (7 billion) corresponded to interest paid by French companies to their foreign subsidiaries within the framework of 
intragroup loans (cf. OECD).
20 See Koopman R., Z. Wang and S.J. Wei (2014): “Tracing Value-Added and Double Counting in Gross Exports”, American Economic Review, vol.  104, 
no 2, pp. 459-494, Stehrer R. (2012): “Trade in Value Added and the Value Added in Trade”, WIIW Working Paper, no 81 and Vicard V. and L. Le Saux 
(2013): “Compétitivité-coût des exportations manufacturières et services incorporés”, Note Banque de France, 4th October. The latter show that the services 
incorporated in manufacturing exports do not worsen the cost competitiveness diﬀ erence between France and Germany.
21 See Cheptea et al., op.cit.
22 See Cheptea et al., op.cit.
23 Cf. ministère de l’Enseignement supérieur et de la Recherche (2013): L’état de l’enseignement supérieur et de la recherche en France, 6th edition.
3. Balance of goods, services, and current account 
France, 1995-2012
Reading: Left scale: current USD (billion); Right scale: current account 
in percent of GDP.
Source: OCDE.
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computers will be reﬂ ected in the productivity of the bank-
ing sector). Knowledge spillovers are related to transfers of 
knowledge from one sector to another, for which no pay-
ments are made, due to the fact that knowledge is a social 
good: research in a given sector produces knowledge that is 
useful for other sectors (for example, progress in information 
technology led to radical changes in the way research is con-
ducted in the pharmaceutical sector).
Because there are many diﬀ erent channels of knowledge dif-
fusion, it is diﬃ  cult to assess the beneﬁ ciaries of all of these 
spillovers, above all in the case of those linked to transfers of 
knowledge. Empirical studies tend to show that these spillo-
vers are in general positive, although the reaping of market 
shares from competitors that produce substitutes to new prod-
ucts should not be overlooked.24 These spillovers may also be 
passed on abroad and beneﬁ t our trade partners, in the same 
way as France may beneﬁ t from R&D conducted abroad.
Numerous studies have documented the geographical dimen-
sion of R&D spillovers, i.e. the fact that the spillover eﬀ ects 
of research are greater in its geographical neighbourhood. 
One of the explanations for this phenomenon apparently lies 
in the partially tacit character of knowledge. Certain kinds of 
knowledge are not transmitted in a codiﬁ ed manner (e.g. in 
computer codes or books) but require face-to-face relations 
between researchers. When this is the case, the creation of 
technology clusters may be justiﬁ ed. Knowledge can never-
theless be eﬀ ectively passed on over long distances.
Industrial decline or structural change?
The observed decline of industry, in the sense of the tradi-
tional statistical category, needs to be reconsidered when 
new forms of industrial organisation are taken into account, 
that is by favouring the notion of intellectual property rather 
than the physical dimension of activities and objects, while 
acknowledging the industrial dimension of the production of 
certain services. Once these dimensions are incorporated, 
the nature of industry changes. There is no great diﬃ  culty in 
tracing the reasons for which the proportion of industrial jobs 
in employment as a whole has sharply declined in the OECD 
economies and in France. For this purpose we adopt a long-
term perspective, from 1970 to 2007:25 we saw above that 
French industry under-performed between 2000 and 2007 
as compared with the European average, and that its capacity 
for recovery after the low point of the crisis was also below 
the Eurozone average.
As seen above, the decline of industry can in the ﬁ rst place be 
explained by a greater rate of productivity growth in industry 
as compared with services and a consumer saturation eﬀ ect, 
consumers allocating an increasing part of their expenditure 
to services when their standard of living increases. The sec-
ond contributing factor to deindustrialisation, the outsourc-
ing of services by industrial companies, is purely a statistical 
artefact. The ﬁ nal contributing factor is industrial competi-
tion: because they have a comparative advantage in tasks 
such as product design, R&D and marketing, high income 
economies tend to specialise in activities that do not nec-
essarily fall within the statistical category of “industry” (the 
reﬂ ection currently being undertaken with regard to FGPs is 
aimed at taking this diﬃ  culty into account).26
We will illustrate these mechanisms in the case of France, 
before assessing the respective contributions of the three 
underlying determinant factors.
The case of France
Here we rely on the STAN Database (OECD). We consider 
the manufacturing industry (therefore excluding construc-
tion and energy). Between 1970 and 2007 the volume of 
French industrial production doubled, in contrast with the 
widely publicised vision of an absolute industrial decline.27 
However, the total value-added in France increased by almost 
160% over the period: the “decline” of the manufacturing 
industry therefore above all reﬂ ects the markedly more rapid 
increase of value-added in services (Figure 4). For the most 
part, the relative decline of industry took place between the 
mid-1970s and the early 1990s. If the analysis is made in 
terms of industrial jobs, rather than industrial value-added, 
a very diﬀ erent picture emerges: between 1970 and 2007, 
the number of hours worked in French industry was halved. 
Labour productivity (the ratio of the volume of value-added 
to the number of hours worked) was almost multiplied by 
four.
At the same time changes occurred in relative prices to the 
disadvantage of industry: more rapid productivity gains in 
industry do explain this phenomenon to a large extent, com-
pounded by lower levels of competition in the services sector 
(services are less exchanged at the international level, and 
therefore not subject to international competition). The (rela-
tive) decline of industry is therefore more marked in terms 
of value than in terms of volume. It follows to a great extent 
the decline of the share of industry in the number of hours 
worked.
24 See Bloom N., M. Schankerman and J. van Reenen (2013): “Identifying Technology Spillovers and Product Market Rivalry”, Econometrica, vol. 81, no 4, 
pp. 1347-1393. According to the authors, due to R&D spillovers the social rate of return on R&D is at least double the private rate of return.
25 The choice to begin the period of study in 1970 was dictated by the desire to properly take into account the eﬀ ect of the ﬁ rst oil crisis on French industry, 
which had to undergo far-reaching restructuring. The choice to stop before the crisis of 2007 was dictated by an obvious fact: to avoid incorporating a period 
into the analysis in which developments were determined by a violent and unprecedented industrial crisis.
26 See Rowthorn R. and R. Ramaswamy (1997): “Deindustrialization. Its Causes and Implications”, IMF Economic Issues, no 10.
27 Only the recent crisis has led to a decline in industrial production in absolute terms (cf. supra).
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Contributions to structural change
Beyond this descriptive approach, it is possible to estimate 
the respective contributions of the various factors mentioned 
(outsourcing of services functions, productivity gains, inter-
national competition –and competition from low-wage coun-
tries) to the observed decline of industrial employment.28 
The very rapid productivity gains in industry have played a 
predominant role in the recent period, in accordance with 
the abovementioned changes in relative prices. On average, 
between 1980 and 2007, France lost 71,000 industrial jobs 
per year, of which 17,000 were attributable to outsourcing 
and 21,000 to productivity gains. From 2000 onwards, with 
losses scarcely any lower (65,000 per year), the contribution 
of productivity began to predominate (42,000 jobs per year), 
with outsourcing playing only a minor role (3,000). The contri-
bution of international competition over the period as a whole 
is estimated at 9,000 job losses per year (of which half for the 
car industry alone) and twice that amount over 2000-2007.29
Observation 3. Deindustrialisation has to 
be described in relative terms. The volume 
of industrial production (in the statistical 
sense) increases less quickly than the 
production of services. Because of the 
decrease in relative prices in industry, the 
diﬀ erence is even more pronounced in value 
terms. Proportional employment patterns 
in the two major sectors correspond to 
changes in value production.
The relative decline of industry is therefore in the ﬁ rst place a 
result of the development of its productivity as compared to 
the service sectors and of changes in household expenditure. 
The nature of jobs and their level of qualiﬁ cation, productivity 
and therefore pay, is more important than the employment 
sector (industry or services) and the kinds of tasks carried 
out. Very productive jobs injecting high incomes into the rest 
of the economy promote the emergence of growth hubs.
What about economic policy?
In this ﬁ nal section we intend to adopt a new approach to 
industrial policy, while seeking to identify the coordination 
problems which need to be resolved and focusing upon the 
modus operandi of policy –that is to say the political econ-
omy of the implementation of industrial policy. Our objec-
tive is not to set out a list of the instruments used, rang-
ing from competitiveness clusters to sectoral subsidies (car 
manufacturing), public procurement and the Banque publique 
d’investissement (BPI). Our intention is to illustrate general 
problems, rather than assessing the existing schemes and 
the way in which they are used.
A new approach
Industrial policy has long been considered primarily as a dis-
tortion of the eﬃ  cient allocation of resources in a market 
economy. “Horizontal” policies creating conditions favoura-
ble for innovation and the creation of businesses (competi-
tion on the goods and input markets, support for research, 
etc.) were given preference over “vertical” public initiatives 
supporting priority sectors selected by the authorities (subsi-
dies, public holding of share capital, customs duties and pub-
lic works contracts). This approach was complemented by 
correction of the market failure regarding externalities (R&D, 
training, and access to credit).
28 See Demmou L. (2010): “Le recul de l’emploi industriel en France entre 1980 et 2007. Ampleur et principaux déterminants: un état des lieux”, Économie 
et Statistique, vol. 438, no 1, pp. 73-296.
29 The sum of the contributions of the three factors is not equal to the total job losses, other factors may be involved. Since calculations of employment 
content of this kind can be criticised for methodological reasons, an econometric approach may be preferred. However, estimates lack precision which leads 
to divergent assessments. Cf. Demmou (2010) op.cit., Rowthorn R. and R. Ramaswamy (1998): “Growth, Trade and Deindustrialization”, IMF Working Paper, 
no WP/98/60 and Boulhol H. and L. Fontagné (2006): “De-Industrialisation and the Fear of Relocations in the Industry”, CEPII Working Paper, no 2006-07.
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The European Commission (2010 and 2012), as well as the 
World Bank (2013) and the OECD (2013), have substantially 
revised their position in this regard. However, as far as the 
European Commission is concerned, this reconsideration is 
a matter of the place of industry in the economy, rather than 
the modes of public intervention. Indeed, whereas the answer 
to the question raised by the title of this Note is emphasised 
in the Communication of the Commission,30 the suggested 
modes of action remain vague since they involve combining 
vertical and horizontal policies in the same approach.31 The 
Commission’s second Communication, issued in 2012, con-
stitutes an even greater change in policy insofar as the sec-
tors are clearly identiﬁ ed in a “vertical” manner: advanced 
technologies for industries, bio industries, environmentally-
friendly construction and materials, clean vehicles and smart 
grids.32 However, the planned actions are primarily based 
upon competition within the internal European market, trans-
port infrastructures, training norms and standards, rather 
than upon vertical actions.
The World Bank and the OECD suggest what appears a pri-
ori to be a bolder approach. The concept of a “new industri-
al and innovation policy” elaborated by the World Bank is not 
aimed at creating a favourable environment (horizontal policy) 
or supporting certain sectors (vertical policy), but at promoting 
restructuring and technological dynamism. The other dimen-
sion of this new policy is to directly address the economic ele-
ments of public intervention in industry. Industrial policy is 
above all considered as a matter of modus operandi.33 In short, 
in place of the traditional horizontal/vertical opposition, this 
new approach centers on the correction of coordination and 
market failures through public action (cluster policies and pub-
lic ﬁ nancing of innovative projects)34 and the construction of 
modes of action that take into account the political economy of 
public intervention regarding companies (and regions).
What coordination and market failures 
is industrial policy intended to resolve?
The ﬁ rst coordination failure is the articulation between 
public and private research, between universities and 
companies, and between large and small companies. The 
clusters policy, under its various forms, addresses this 
concern: the resolution of a coordination problem between 
agents. The clusters policy is based upon the premise that 
economic activities are insuﬃ  ciently grouped together and 
of inadequate geographical density. Geographical proximity 
enables companies to take advantage of the complementarity 
of their respective skills. The concentration of ﬁ rms and skills 
in the same place facilitates the transfer of knowledge, and 
above all tacit knowledge, and the emergence of knowledge-
based externalities. However, empirical studies cast doubt 
upon the eﬀ ectiveness of a clusters policy. In the ﬁ ve largest 
urban areas in Norway, the most innovative companies, in the 
sense of radical innovations, are those which are connected 
to several international networks. Too many exclusively 
local relations hinder innovation because of lack of new 
ideas.35 In the case of France, although beneﬁ ts arising from 
geographical concentration exist, they are limited: doubling 
employment in one sector and one employment area 
increases the productivity of local companies by less than 
5%.36 The selection of companies and clusters also poses 
problems. The previous policy of local production systems 
was aimed at companies in low productivity sectors and 
locations.37 The new competitiveness clusters policy, on the 
contrary, is on the whole concerned with more productive 
companies and locations, independently of their grouping 
within a cluster.38
A second market failure deals with the failure to take advan-
tage of research externalities. If these externalities are posi-
tive, as is shown by empirical studies, too little research is 
conducted from a social point of view, since private com-
panies do not incorporate these externalities into their eco-
nomic calculations. Various measures can be implemented 
in order to stimulate research, such as research tax credits, 
research grants, transfer of technologies, research centres 
and public procurement.
A third market failure concerns cross-border mergers and 
acquisitions. The market is not always able to diﬀ erentiate 
between operations that are desirable from a social point of 
view and those which are not. Public authorities can there-
fore check the desirability of operations or contribute to 
30  “A vibrant and highly competitive EU manufacturing sector can provide the resources and many of the solutions for the societal challenges facing the EU 
[…]”, cf. European Commission (2010): An Integrated Industrial Policy for the Globalisation Era, Putting Competitiveness and Sustainability at Centre Stage, 
Communication, COM (2010) 614, p. 4).
31 “All sectors being important, the Commission will continue to apply a targeted approach to all sectors. Some sector-speciﬁ c initiatives could be taken 
for certain types of sectors […]”, cf. Commission European (2010), op.cit., p. 28. The sectors in question are the aerospace industry, environmental goods, 
health, security and energy intensive sectors exposed to international competition.
32 See European Commission (2012): A Stronger European Industry for Growth and Economic Recovery, Communication, COM(2012) 582.
33 See the “New industrial policy” section of the World Bank’s Knowledge 4 Development website.
34 The clusters policy is mentioned in the communication of the European Commission, but in relation to its regional policy.
35 See Fitjar R.D. and A. Rodríguez-Pose (2011): When Local Interaction Does Not Suﬃ  ce: Sources of Firm Innovation in Urban Norway”, Environment and 
Planning, no 43, pp. 1248-1267.
36 The sectors refer to the French business nomenclature (Nomenclature d’activités française) (rév. 2, 2008), niveau 3 (INSEE).
37 See Duranton G., P. Martin, T. Mayer and F. Mayneris (2010): The Economics of Clusters, Lessons from the French Experience, Oxford University Press.
38 See Fontagné L., P. Koenig, F. Mayneris and S. Poncet (2013): Cluster Policies and Firm Selection: Evidence from France”, Journal of Regional Science, 
vol. 53, no 5, pp. 354-374.
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the organisation thereof, while promoting their own speciﬁ c 
objectives (employment, transfer of technology, prestige).
The ﬁ nal market failure has to do with access to ﬁ nance. 
Diﬃ  cult ﬁ nancing for medium-sized businesses, high-risk 
start-ups and, above all, small and medium enterprises 
(SMEs) constitutes a recurring problem. With of the likely 
tightening of access to credit as a result of the crisis, this 
issue is once again at the centre of current policies. The 
development of private venture capital can substitute for or 
complement public action. Venture capital invests in research 
companies not only ﬁ nancially but also through active man-
agement for a limited period of time, which limits the moral 
hazard problems that are typical of ﬁ nancing on the basis of 
public research grants. However, empirical studies are not 
unanimous on this issue.39 Whereas most studies on aggre-
gate data ﬁ nd that venture capital has a positive eﬀ ect on the 
number of patents awarded, those using ﬁ rm-level data lead 
to subtler conclusions, or even conclude that the granting 
of patents slows down following venture capital investment. 
This may be explained by investors seeking rapid returns on 
their investments and being more interested in taking advan-
tage of existing innovative potential in the companies they 
ﬁ nance, rather than developing new research projects. It is 
therefore likely that market failure is not entirely resolved by 
calling upon private venture capital. As we shall see below, 
private venture capital can nevertheless play a key role as a 
complement to public action.
Whatever the failures to be corrected, there is a problem of 
information. In terms of economic analysis, principals (who 
subsidise or invest) do not have all of the necessary informa-
tion in order to make informed decisions, and therefore have 
to procure it from agents (who receive the funds), who will 
therefore adopt strategies that do not necessarily guarantee 
desirable results. In practice, this means that a method of 
ensuring transmission of information to the authorities needs 
to be found concerning the companies and laboratories that 
operate within the clusters and the potential of the territo-
ries that host them. As far as credit access is concerned, 
one needs to determine whether the company concerned by 
the supposed credit rationing is or is not a “good risk”. With 
regard to the research tax credit, the question of windfall 
eﬀ ects is often raised (tax credit for research which would 
have been undertaken in any case). We have chosen to look 
more closely at the two latter examples in order to illustrate 
our observations.
In November 2013, the Ministry for Industrial Renewal (min-
istère du Redressement productif) re-launched the Resistance 
Fund (Fonds de résistance).40 This decision came along with 
reinforcing the Interministerial Committee for Industrial 
Restructuring (CIRI: Comité interministériel de restructuration 
industrielle),41 increasing social support in case of bankrupt-
cy and and emergency amendments to the bankruptcy laws. 
The Resistance Fund is intended to help medium-sized com-
panies in diﬃ  culty by granting loans, subject to certain con-
ditions, to those of them who so request. No subsidies are 
involved. The project has to be viable (repayment capacity). 
Changes of management or shareholding are considered and 
the CIRI is entitled to submit restructuring proposals. This 
policy illustrates two problems.
First of all, the amount of the fund –300 million euros 
(Finance Bill for 2014)– scarcely exceeded 0.1% of the out-
standing credits granted to non-ﬁ nancial medium-sized com-
panies in October 2013.42 Only marginal credit access prob-
lems can be dealt with using such limited funds: in the case 
of major problems, shortages of funds will impose high levels 
of selectiveness, based upon urgency of action criteria, of 
which it will be impossible to be properly informed due to the 
information problems already emphasised.
Furthermore, which market failure justiﬁ es this measure? An 
examination of the data of the OECD, European Commission, 
INSEE and the Bank of France does not indicate any clear 
deterioration of credit access and conditions. Between 2008 
and 2011, the stock of loans granted to SMEs43 increased 
by almost 5% per year, with the exception of 2009 (0.3%).44 
Indeed, SMEs demonstrate a decline in the willingness of 
banks to grant credit (– 22%).45 However, according to the 
ECB, although the challenge of credit access for French SMEs 
increased slightly in 2013 (considered by 14.8% of SMEs to 
be the most urgent challenge), the level of this challenge is 
below the European average. As far as labour costs are con-
cerned, 19.8% French SMEs placed them foremost amongst 
their concerns.46 For its part, INSEE considers that, contra-
ry to the United States, businesses in France have suﬀ ered 
more from a demand slump than from a credit crunch. This is 
conﬁ rmed by the Bank of France which shows, on the basis 
39 See Arque-Castells P. (2012): “How Venture Capitalists Spur Invention in Spain: Evidence from Patent Trajectories”, Research Policy, no 41, pp. 897-912.
40 Referred to as the Economic and Social Development Fund (Fonds de développement économique et social) at the time of its creation in 1948.
41 Cf. https://www.tresor.economie.gouv.fr/CIRI
42 The total amount of outstanding credit granted to non-ﬁ nancial medium-sized companies came to 273 billion in October 2013 (cf. Statistical data of the 
Banque de France).
43 It is recalled that the resistance fund is aimed at medium-sized companies and not SMEs.
44 Cf. OECD (2013): “Recent Trends in SME and Entrepreneurship Finance” in Financing SMEs and Entrepreneurs, http://www.oecd.org/cfe/smes/
Scoreboard_2013_extract_chapter2.pdf
45 Cf. European Central Bank (2013): Survey on the Access to Finance of Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises in the Euro Area, http://www.ecb.europa.eu/
pub/pdf/other/accesstoﬁ nancesmallmediumsizedenterprises201311en.pdf
46 The Bank of France describes the situation with greater contrasts, noting an increase in applications for new credits on the part of medium-sized 
enterprises and an improvement in their rate of acceptance in 2013, see Banque de France (2013): “Enquête trimestrielle auprès des PME et ETI sur leur 
accès au crédit en France”, Stat Info, 3rd quarter.
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of a sample of 60,000 SMEs, that in spite of the more restric-
tive behaviour of banks, French SMEs have not suﬀ ered from 
marked credit restriction between 2008 and 2010. The prob-
lem was that of a demand crisis.47 Why then do certain SMEs 
ﬁ nd themselves refused access to credit? The answer lies 
less in a failure of the credit market than in the fact of their 
insuﬃ  cient proﬁ tability being sanctioned by the market. The 
appropriate policy is therefore to restore the proﬁ tability of 
medium-sized enterprises, in particular by focusing upon the 
issue of labour costs.
We shall now turn to the questions raised by the research tax 
credit (CIR: Crédit impôt recherche). Rather than an overall 
reduction of taxation, more targeted action can be planned 
with regard to research, and the research tax credit corre-
sponds perfectly to this objective. Tax credits are moreover 
less costly to implement than direct research grants. The 
ﬁ rst diﬃ  culty lies in the fact that not all companies neces-
sarily have an adequate level of information at their dispos-
al regarding the practical details and conditions of obtaining 
indirect aid, above all when frequent policy changes occur in 
a short space of time, as has been the case in France. Under 
these conditions, access to such schemes on the part of the 
smallest high-growth potential companies may give reasons 
for concern. An enquiry conducted by Ernst & Young, con-
cerning 250 French SMEs reports that 71% of companies 
consider it diﬃ  cult to gain access to the aid schemes and 
58% consider the preparation of applications to be too com-
plicated.48
Empirical studies concerning the eﬀ ectiveness of such 
schemes tend to show that research undertaken by compa-
nies does not greatly exceed the amount that is subsidised 
(multiplier eﬀ ect appears to be minimal).49 Furthermore, for 
larger companies there is a windfall eﬀ ect: They beneﬁ t more 
than small companies from the system, whereas it is the lat-
ter that have a problem in accessing ﬁ nancing for research. 
Few studies have been devoted to calculating the net social 
beneﬁ t of the scheme: this means including the social ben-
eﬁ ts linked to the R&D spillovers, the administration costs 
for the authorities in charge of the policy and the implemen-
tation costs for the companies as well as the excess burden 
of taxation. The recent study by Mulkay and Mairesse (2013) 
considers that the reform of the R&D tax credit will increase 
research capital by 12% in the long term, which corresponds 
to a ratio of additional R&D expenditure to tax expenditure 
that is not signiﬁ cantly greater than  1, and does not take 
the R&D spillovers into account, which many studies have 
assessed as being beneﬁ cial.50
The modus operandi of public intervention 
in industry
How can government intervene in practice to correct the 
coordination and market failures that hinder the harmonious 
development of industry, broadly understood as incorporat-
ing the high value-added services that are linked thereto? As 
has been pointed out, this is not only a question of creating a 
favourable environment, and it would be better to avoid sup-
porting certain sectors that government might have plausi-
bly identiﬁ ed as being proﬁ table (government does not have 
any more information than the private sector in this regard). 
Horizontal policies, which are often considered to be the 
sole policies compatible with the rules of competition, are 
probably not suﬃ  cient; vertical policies, for their part, run 
the risk of encouraging existing setups that are in decline, 
reproducing what has been done with success elsewhere, or 
even attributing excessive weight to measures that bolster 
the image of the political decision-makers (environmentally-
friendly growth, electric cars, etc.).
In an economy subject to a highly competitive and changing 
environment, public policy in favour of industry (in the broad 
sense) consists of promoting restructuring and technological 
dynamism. Clusters can be the right level of public interven-
tion, not as a speciﬁ c form of concentration of activity (when 
this is the objective, infrastructures and regulatory reforms 
encouraging mobility are probably more appropriate instru-
ments), but as places of coordination of actors, in cases 
where coordination problems have been diagnosed. In spite 
of the criticisms that may be levelled against it in terms of 
windfall eﬀ ects recalled above, the R&D tax credit goes in that 
direction of tapping into high value-added segments in a non-
cooperative international environment. Under-pricing of road 
facilities for carriers is, on the contrary, an example of an unde-
sirable policy, promoting the siting of logistic centres within 
the territory. Indeed, the aim is to attract high-income jobs 
with substantial local externalities in terms of expenditure.
47 See Cabannes P-Y., V. Cottet, Y. Dubois and M. Sicsic (2013): “Les ajustements des entreprises françaises pendant la crise de 2008-2009” in L’économie 
française 2013, INSEE (ed.) and Kremp E. and P. Sevestre (2013): “Did the Crisis Induce Credit Rationing for French SMEs?”, Document de Travail de la Banque 
de France, no 405.
48 Ernst & Young (2013): L’eﬃ  cacité des aides publiques aux entreprises: quelles priorités pour la compétitivité française.
49 See Ientile D. and J. Mairesse (2009): “A Policy to Boost the R&D: Does the Tax Credit Work?”, European Investment Bank Paper, vol. 14, no 1.
50 See Mulkay B. and J. Mairesse (2013): “The R&D Tax Credit in France: Assessment and ex ante Evaluation of the 2008 Reform”, NBER Working Paper, 
no 19073. The existence of a lower than one multiplier conﬁ rms the results obtained for the Netherlands. See Lokshin B. and P. Mohnen (2012): “How 
Eﬀ ective are Level-Based R&D Tax Credits? Evidence from the Netherlands”, Applied Economics, vol. 44, no 12, pp. 1527-1538 and Mohnen P. and B. Lokshin 
(2010): “What Does it Take for an R&D Tax Incentive Policy to be Eﬀ ective?” in Reforming Rules and Regulations: Laws, Institutions and Implementation, Vivek 
Ghosal (ed.), MIT Press, pp. 33-58.
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The other dimension of this new policy is to directly address 
the political economy of public intervention in industry. Firstly, 
where is the information required to undertake policies to be 
found? How can market failures be pinpointed? How can stra-
tegic value segments be identiﬁ ed? How to identify territories 
conducive to coordination between actors? How to detect 
companies that can be usefully assisted by public funds? On 
the assumption that the government does not have this infor-
mation, the latter needs to be passed on to decision-making 
bodies. Action in favour of industry begins with passing on 
information to decision-makers. A risk of government capture 
results from the information asymmetry. The problem is not 
completely resolved by the creation of public agencies and 
specialised ﬁ nancial institutions, due to the diﬃ  culty of ensur-
ing the independent judgement of the latter. This indeed con-
stitutes the primary risk of capture: assisting visible setups 
because they are in diﬃ  culty or suﬃ  ciently large or close to 
the governing elites to support their concerns.51
Secondly, how should failures be managed? Entrepreneurial 
activity is inherently subject to high levels of failure. There is 
therefore a need to know how to bring an end to projects that 
do not produce the expected results (of which there are nec-
essarily many), in order to be able to focus investment upon 
the smaller number of projects that are successful, as well 
as, of course, undertaking new ones. The private sector has 
this capacity (when it does not, it is sanctioned by the mar-
ket); this is less the case as far as public decision-makers are 
concerned, due to local issues which interfere with their deci-
sions (clusters are by deﬁ nition localised). This corresponds 
to a secondary risk of government capture: once launched, 
projects can hardly be stopped.
Observation 4. When the public authorities 
intervene, in particular with the support of 
specialised agencies, the primary risk of 
capture is present: agencies do not have 
comprehensive information concerning 
the companies ﬁ nanced. When ﬁ nancing 
is granted to a project or company, the 
secondary risk of capture is the diﬃ  culty 
of bringing this support to an end due 
to the local impact thereof in terms of 
employment, legitimately defended by local 
elected representatives.
An exhaustive analysis of the industrial policies implement-
ed in other countries is beyond the scope of this Note. The 
Israeli economy provides an interesting example: Is the vis-
ible hand of the government the key to industrial success? 
Indeed, although Israel is one of the youngest of the indus-
trialised countries, its economy shows an R&D/GDP ratio 
which is well above the OECD average (4.3% in 2010 as com-
pared with 2.4% for the OECD).52 The keys to the success of 
the Israeli experience are based upon three factors:
 – the existence of research projects, resulting from state-
of-the-art training, the massive arrival of well-trained 
immigrants and close cooperation between universities 
and the private sector;
 – governance based upon incubators ﬁ nanced both 
by public funds for limited periods and private funds, 
with strong incentive to select promising projects as a 
result;
 – public ﬁ nance on a venture capital basis, to a large 
extent fed by taxes and suﬃ  ciently ﬂ exible to discon-
tinue projects doomed to be failures.
From this example we take the importance of training, of the 
governance of public interventions and of venture capital as 
a strategic complement to public intervention.53
Conclusion
Industrialised countries no longer have any, or virtually any, 
industry: industry sells services; services constitute an 
industry; countries no longer only exchange goods with one 
another; multinational companies exchange tasks between 
their subsidiaries located in diﬀ erent regions of the world; the 
tremendous productivity gains in factories have shifted value 
to research, design departments and ideas. Under these con-
ditions, what economic policy should be pursued in order to 
support what is still referred to as industry, but which actu-
ally corresponds to the concentration of growth clusters of 
high value-added activities, with high levels of externalities, 
bringing high-incomes into the economy as a whole? Today, 
wealth is created in clusters of services and industries which 
are integrated into global value chains. This new reality needs 
to be accepted, while integrating industrial policy into a mode 
of governance that incorporates the political economy of 
public intervention.
51 In Kramarz F. and D. Thesmar (2013): “Social network In the Boardroom”, Journal of the European Economic Association, vol. 11, no 4, pp. 780-807, the 
authors econometrically conﬁ rm the role of networks in the appointment of managing teams and the underperformance of organisations that tend to give 
in to this inclination more frequently.
52 Cf. http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/science-and-technology/gross-domestic-expenditure-on-r-d_2075843x-table1
53 See Carpentier C. and J-M. Suret (2004): “Création et ﬁ nancement des entreprises technologiques: les leçons du modèle israélien”, Cahier de Recherche 
CIRANO, no 2004RP-20.
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Recommendations
Recommendation 1
Industry needs to be rethought and should 
no longer be equated with the production 
of goods. Political ideas need to be adapted 
in order to encourage restructuring and 
technological dynamism. Competitiveness 
policies need to be rethought by focusing 
them on productivity and innovation in 
high value-added areas. The scope of 
competitiveness clusters therefore needs 
to be reduced and refocused upon high 
value-added sectors.
Recommendation 2
Invest in training and promote the mobility 
of resources that can be concentrated 
in growth hubs. Re-examination of the 
bankruptcy law promotes the same end: 
increasing the “ﬂ uidity” of the French 
economy.
Recommendation 3
In a context of non-cooperative national 
policies, the government needs to promote 
investment in research and development 
through the research tax credit, direct 
aid schemes such as the ANVAR, venture 
capital and technology bridges.
Recommendation 4
Strike the right balance between the need 
to protect intellectual property, in order to 
stimulate innovation, and maximum sharing 
of knowledge, which can give rise to future 
technological progress. At the European 
level, ﬁ ght against the use of patents as 
a strategic weapon, such as unfair use of 
patent thickets and splitting of patents, 
and promote strict criteria of patentability 
avoiding as far as possible the granting of 
monopoly rights to patents of poor quality.
Recommendation 5
Combine private venture capital and public 
ﬁ nancing of projects. Avoid public stake 
holding in private companies whenever 
there is no sign of a market failure in terms 
of ﬁ nancing.
Recommendation 6
It is imperative for industrial policy to 
be accompanied with strict governance 
notably enabling projects to be 
discontinued.
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